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PROBLEMS OF MEASURING AND ACHIEVING
EQUALITY OF REPRESENTATION
IN STATE LEGISLATURES
Alan L. Clem*
I. INTRODUCTION
Americans live by a number of basic principles of government
which are perceived to help guarantee the freedom of the individual
within the context of the security of the community. Certain of
these principles are commonly verbalized: "equality before the
law"; the "first amendment freedoms" guaranteeing freedom of
speech, press, worship, assembly, and petition; and "government
of the people, by the people, and for the people" upholding the
citizen's right and duty to take part in the government of his society.
This article is concerned with one of the most basic of these
principles of democratic self-government, the principle that every
man should have an equal voice in the basic group decision-making
process underlying our government system- the process of choos-
ing the officials who make and administer laws at the local, state,
and national level. Specifically, this study discusses the problem
of how each voter's equality of influence in electing members of
state legislatures may be measured and achieved.
The article does not address itself to the problem of devising
a method of arranging legislative districts, as this is the function
of legislatures or of special commissions that have been established
in a few states. There are fifty different systems of apportionment
being used in the fifty states, thus making it impractical to suggest
a mandatory plan for each. Any of the present apportionment
methods would be allowable so long as it does not produce undue
distortion of representation. This article's attention is accordingly
directed toward devising a method of measuring the degree to which
an apportionment fairly and equitably reflects population distri-
bution.
II. IMPACT OF BAKER v. CARR
In the year that has passed since the United States Supreme
Court's landmark decision in Baker v. Carr,' the problem of devis-
* Associate Professor of Government and Assistant Director, Govern-
mental Research Bureau, University of South Dakota, Vermillion. B.A.,
University of Nebraska, 1950; M.A., The American University, 1957;
Ph.D., The American University, 1960.
1369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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ing a method of measuring apportionment has been considered only
obliquely by a small percentage of the many writers who have dis-
cussed the implications of Baker in news and opinion magazines
and in the scholarly journals in the field of law and political
science.2 Rather, major attention has been focused on broader
implications, such as the decision's effect on our federal system
or its indication of an increasingly activist role by the federal courts
in relation to state government. Prior to Baker, a series of decisions
typified by Colegrove v. Green3 had refused to recognize that ap-
portionment systems, which deprived certain citizens of equality,
were justiciable. Baker v. Carr for the first time stated that
the apportionment of seats in state legislatures was a matter
properly to be reviewed by the federal courts. Justice Brennan's
majority opinion stated in clear terms that "the complaint's allega-
tions of a denial of equal protection present a justiciable constitu-
tional cause of action upon which appellants are entitled to a trial
and a decision. The right asserted is within the reach of judicial
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment."4
Though the decision created a storm of controversy, it is not
yet apparent just how seriously it will affect state legislative ap-
portionment systems. Mr. Justice Brennan could only state: 5
Beyond noting that we have no cause at this stage to doubt the
District Court will be able to fashion relief if violations of constitu-
tional rights are found, it is improper now to consider what remedy
would be most appropriate if appellants [those seeking reapportion-
ment] prevail at the trial.
Perhaps the most serious handicap to the efforts of those advocating
more equitable distribution of legislative power is that neither
lawyers nor political scientists nor mathematicians6 have yet been
2 Professor Israel discusses in considerable detail some of the leading
mathematical problems encountered in the courts in past decisions
dealing with congressional or legislative apportionment. Israel, On
Charting a Course through the Mathematical Quagmire: The Future of
Baker v. Carr, 61 Micir. L. REv. 107 (1962).
3 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
4 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962).
5 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962). One writer concludes: "Yet, at this writing, the
standards to be applied remain vague." Friedelbaum, Baker v. Carr: The
New Doctrine of Judicial Intervention and Its Implications for Ameri-
can Federalism, 29 U. CH. L. REV. 673, 703 (1962).
6 After a struggle that raged for years among mathematicians as well as
among courts, congressmen, and political scientists, the mathematical
aspects of apportionment in the U.S. House of Representatives were
settled thirty years ago on what has so far been a permanent and
reasonably amicable basis. The name of the formula employed is that
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 42, NO. 3
able to agree on a method to define a proper apportionment system.
This handicap is confounded by the fact that the federal union is
composed of fifty states, each of which has its own legislative system
and its own system of apportioning the seats thereof among its
citizens. Solutions then, to be coherent, must somehow take into
account the serious problem of how to properly apportion legislative
seats within each state, when each state is so diverse in such matters
as population, geographical size, and the degree of concentration
of the population in cities. "If the traditional diversities of Ameri-
can federalism are to be preserved, flexible standards, especially
adapted to districting, need to be developed. ' 7 The process of dis-
tributing legislative seats in a state with a population of fifteen
million, of which seventy per cent is classified as urban, is different
in many ways from the process of distributing legislative seats in
a state with a population of 200,000, of which twenty-five per cent
is urban. The problem is not simplified by the fact that the size
of state legislative bodies also varies.8
of "equal proportions." This formula can be employed where all
political units subordinate at one level (states in relation to the federal
government or counties in relation to states) are guaranteed at least
one seat in the legislative body. See the discussion in ScHMEcKEBIER,
CONGRESSIONAL APPORTIONMENT (1941); GALLOWAY, THE LEGISLATIVE
PROCESS IN CONGRESS 264-270 (1953); and H.R. REP. No. 2223, 86th Cong.,
2d Sess. 1-7 (1960).
7 Friedelbaum, supra note 5, at 698.
SIZE OF STATE LEGISLATIVE BODIES
UPPER HOUSES LOWER HOUSES BOTH HOUSES
(including Nebraska) (excluding Nebraska) (including Nebraska)
Size Number Size Number Size Number
Under 20 2 Under 50 3 Under 50 1
20-29 7 50-99 15 50-99 9
30-39 21 100-199 25 100-149 17
40-49 11 200-299 5 150-199 14
50-59 8 Over 300 1 200-299 7
Over 60 1 Over 300 2
TOTAL 50 TOTAL 49 TOTAL 50
Delaware and Nevada share the honor of having the smallest upper
chamber, with seventeen members each, while Minnesota has the
largest, with sixty-seven. Delaware's lower house, with thirty-five,
also has the fewest members and New Hampshire's, with four hundred,
has the most members in the lower house. Nebraska's unique uni-
cameral legislature, with forty-three members, has the fewest members
and New Hampshire has the most, with 424 members in the total legis-
lative body.
Data compiled by author from a table entitled "The Legislators: Num-
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Before discussing the relationship between equal representation
and equal protection, it is appropriate to consider briefly the ques-
tion of whether or not even roughly equivalent voting power for
each citizen is an essential in our system of government. In other
words, is it necessary that "equal representation" be related to
voting rights? This is a basic question, and not as easy to solve
as it may appear. The American political tradition, while trending
in the direction of securing the proposition of "equality before the
law" in the matter of voting rights, has not always upheld it. The
pre-Baker apportionment decisions themselves worked against the
principle by leaving the matter to be solved by local legislatures.
One writer concludes: "Our experience with legislative reappor-
tionment by the legislatures themselves proves that it is a little
like do-it-yourself surgery, a painful job that is apt to be done
badly."9 Informal agreements within the various states as to the
distribution of seats among certain cities or sections often have the
same effect. Many of our election systems, both public and private,
distribute power unequally among individuals.10
Equality of representation in a large community is almost
necessarily a matter of relativity and can be measured by the rela-
tive importance of one citizen's vote compared with the votes of
all others in electing members of the legislative body. In this
country, and increasingly in the free world generally, many have
agreed that as an ideal one man should have one vote.,' Each
bers, Terms, and Party Affiliation as of November 1, 1961," in T I
CouNcn. or STATE GOVERNMENTS, TBE BOOK OF T=E STATES, 1962-63, 41(1962).
9 Schattschneider, Urbanization and Reapportionment, 72 YALE L.J. 7, 12
(1962).
1OFor example, the votes of corporation stockholders are generally
weighted in proportion to the amount of stock owned. Since all fifty
states each elect two United States senators, there is unequal represen-
tation of citizens in that body in proportion to the population spread
among the states.
11Professor Baker has epitomized this ideal in the title of an article.
Baker, One Vote, One Value, 47 NAT'L MuNIc. REV. 16, 20 (1958).
The recent Supreme Court decision in Gray v. Sanders is much to the
point. "The concept of 'we the people' under the Constitution visualizes
no preferred class of voters but equality among those who meet the basic
qualifications.... [O]nce the class of voters is chosen and their qualifica-
tions specified, we see no constitutional way by which equality of voting
power may be evaded.... The conception of political equality from the
Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the
Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only
one thing-one person, one vote." Gray v. Sanders, 83 Sup. Ct. 801, 808,
809 (1962). Another authority supports the same point of view. " 'Equal
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responsible adult should have an equal voice in the choice of his
representatives. Stiglitz v. Schardien, a 1931 state court decision,
persuasively argues for equality of representation as follows: 12
Equality of representation in the law-making, tax-levying bodies
is a fundamental requisite of a free government, and no unbiased,
fair, or just man has any right to claim a greater share of the voting
power of the people than is granted to every other man similarly
situated. It is vain for the people to hope for reforms of abuses
or righteous results in legislation if the legislative bodies are not
fairly representative of the spirit, purpose, and will of all the
people, without discrimination.
Boiled down to its essentials, the problem of expanding voting
equality is generally viewed as an attempt to increase the voting
power of urban voters. Baker v. Carr has been viewed as "an episode
in the urbanization of the American community."'13 This opens an
area which has received considerable attention. In discussing the
subject a generation ago, one writer stated that "what is important
is the underrepresentation of aggregates - of a group of correlated
interests. The most significant general line of demarcation between
interests in American state politics has been the cleavage between
country and city."' 4 Much has been written on the merits of repre-
senting the people on the one hand, or political units on the other.
protection of the laws' would seem to presume, and considerations of
political equity demand, that the opportionment of both houses in the
State legislature, be based strictly on population." ADVISORY COMMISSION
ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, APPORTIONMENT OF STATE LEGISLA-
TURES 67, 1962.
12 239 Ky. 799, 812, 40 S.W.2d 315, 321 (1931); accord, American Federation
of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, Unequal Voting: A
Challenge to Democracy. LABOR'S ECON. REV. 80-100 (Dec. 1956).
See also Gray v. Sanders, 83 Sup. Ct. 801 (1963).
13 Schattschneider, supra note 9, at 7. In this connection, Professor Shull's
report on a questionnaire survey a decade ago indicated that informed
observers believed that rivalries between rural and urban areas were
caused by legislative apportionment systems to a far greater extent
than rivalries between political parties, geographical regions, labor and
business, or parts of metropolitan areas. Shull, Political and Partisan
Implications of State Legislative Apportionment, 17 LAw & CONTEM.
PROB. 417, 431 (1952). But cf. Derge, Metropolitan and Outstate Align-
ments in Illinois and Missouri Legislative Delegations, 52 Am. POL. ScI.
REV. 1051, 1065 (1958), which concludes that the real conflict is not
between urban and rural legislators, but between opposing camps of
legislators within the metropolitan area. Professor Derge says: "The
city's bitterest opponents in the legislature are political enemies from
within its own walls, and those camped in the adjoining suburban areas."
14 Walter, Reapportionment and Urban Representation, 195 ANNALS 11,
13 (1938). But see Derge, supra note 13.
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Arguments for the f ormer tend to be advanced by urban interests
whereas rural interests support the latter.15
In summary, while there are some dissenters, the articles and
books dealing with apportionment are heavily weighted in favor
of establishing apportionment systems giving each citizen a voting
power as mathematically equitable as practicable. One recent
article states that "it is their representative character which makes
legislatures authoritative -and legitimate. Through the process of
representation, legislatures are presumably empowered to act for
the whole body politic and are legitimized.' 16 A study in this area
proceeded on the similar assumption "that a legislature which does
not equably represent the people of the state contains an innate
Weakness which limits the effective functioning of that government
on many types of problems.'17 Mr. Justice Harlan counters these
general statements favoring the establishment of equitable represen-
tation with a reasoned comment on the difficulties of applying math-
ematical measurements to legislative apportionment: 'Is
The fault with a purely statistical approach . . . lies not with the
particular mathematical formula used, but in the failure to take
account of the fact that a multitude of legitimate legislative policies,
along with circumstances of geography and demography, could ac-
count for the seeming electoral disparities among counties.
Certainly there are serious problems involved, but if there is such
a thing as malapportionment, how can it be measured or expressed
in other than mathematical terms? This article has as its goal the
solution of the problem of establishing mathematical standards
that do take into account the factors mentioned by Mr. Justice Har-
lan. Mathematics provides tools which must be used if malappor-
ionment is to be located, and this task must be accomplished before
citizens can begin, in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's words, to "sear the
consciences" of their representatives.
5 For example, favoring the personal approach, see-Baker, supra note 11;
- Alnaumann, Rural Ohio Hangs On. 46- NAT' Mumic. REV. 222 (1957); Snow,,
7 Parliamentary Reapportionment Proposals in the Puritan Revolution, 74
ENG. HIST. REv. 409 (1959); the decision in Scholle v. Hare,
369 U.S. 429 (1962); and THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, ONE MAN-ONE
-- V&Ti-97- 1 9) -F - thle--s-iing-fed-erialrue-g nti eeJ-s t-ic-e Frank-
furter's dissent in the Baker case and Perrin, In Defense of Country
Votes, 5XYALE EV. 16 (1962).
16 Eulau, Wah'ke, Buchanan, & Ferguson, The Role of the Representative:
Some Empirical Observations on the Theory of Edmund Burke, 53 Am.
POL. Sci. REV. 742 (1959)..
17 Dauer & Kelsay, Unrepresentative States, 44 NAT'L Mimic. REV. 571
(Dec., 1955).
18369 U.S. 186, 345 (1962).
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III. HOW MALAPPORTIONMENT HAS BEEN MEASURED
Jurists and scholars have applied five major methods of measur-
ing the extent to which state apportionment systems are inequitable.
The problems involved in measuring and achieving equitable
apportionment will be better understood after a quick review of
these methods, noting their comparative advantages and limita-
tions.
The first method to be considered is the most widely used
method of measuring legislative malapportionment, and it involves
finding deviations from the normal or average constituency. 19 First,
the average constituency of each seat in each chamber is found, and
this average is compared with the actual population of each legisla-
tive district. The deviation between average and actual population
shows the degree of over- or underrepresentation. For example, if
the average lower chamber constituency is 20,000 and a given lower
chamber district has a population of 25,000, the district is under-
represented by twenty-five per cent. Authorities have placed vari-
ous limits - such as ten, twelve, fifteen, or twenty per cent - on
the allowable deviation from the average. The advantage of the
system of deviations is that it places a precise numerical value on
each district's malapportionment. It relates malapportionment to
the district itself and thus points out in general terms where adjust-
ments are needed. Deviations are generally given for entire dis-
tricts, however, and not for specific counties. To be most useful,
the system of deviations needs to be related to counties or other
specific permanent political units. More importantly, the system
of deviations lacks a formula by which a specific political unit's
total malapportionment in both chambers can be expressed. It is
possible for a particular county to be overrepresented in one cham-
ber and underrepresented in the other, or, more typically, the degree
of malapportionment is much greater in one chamber than in the
other.
The National Municipal League developed a second method,
based on deviations from the normal constituency, but sufficiently
19 The following are examples of monographs using this method in dis-
cussing legislative apportionment in particular states: HOBBS, LEGISLA-
TIVE APPORTIONMENT IN MISSISSIPPI (1956); WEAVER, LEGISLATIVE RE-
APPORTIONMENT IN UTAH (1950); HAVARD & BETH, REPRESENTATIVE Gov-
ERNMENT AND REAPPORTIONMENT (1960); DRURY & TITUS, LEGISLATIVE
APPORTIONMENT IN KANSAS (1960); and GARFINKEL & FEN, FAIR REPRE-
SENTATION: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO LEGISLATIn APPORTIONMENT IN MICHI-
GAN (1960).
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different to merit special mention.20 The deviation from the stand-
ard population of each district in both chambers is computed; the
deviations are added together (without regard to plus or minus
signs), and a ratio is established which compares for each chamber
average deviations per district with the standard or average con-
stituency. If the average deviation per district is 10,000, and the
standard or average constituency is 50,000, the ratio would be 0.20.
The ratio is useful principally to compare one state's degree of
malapportionment with that of other states; it is not helpful in locat-
ing the "problem" areas within each state.
The third method is also essentially a device to compare mal-
apportionment among several states.21 In this method, the key
finding is the percentage of the total state population that is neces-
sary to elect a majority of a given state legislative chamber. The
nearer to fifty per cent the necessary percentage, the more equit-
able is the state's apportionment.
The fourth method represents the most recent major statistical
study of malapportionment and is the result of an extensive in-
vestigation.22 The central problem studied was that of the familiar
rural-urban conflict. Included are tables for each state for the
years 1910, 1930, 1950, and 1960, categorizing the counties of each
state into four population groups and working out, first, the pro-
portionate share of voting strength in both chambers and, second,
the average values of the vote for representation as percentages of
the state-wide average. Similar data is given for each county or
other major political subdivision in the fifty states.
A fifth method of measurement, which most closely approxi-
mates the method to be suggested and developed in this paper, was
used by Mr. Justice Clark in his concurring opinion in Baker v.
Carr2 and adapted by Mr. Justice Harlan in a dissenting opinion.
24
2 0 NATIONAL MUNIcIPAL LEAGUE, COMPENDIUm ON LEGISLATIVE APPORTION-
MENT (1960).
2X Dauer & Kelsay, supra note 17.
2 2 DAvID & EISENBERG, DEVALUATION OF THE URBAN AND SUBURBAN VOTE:
A STATISTICAL INVESTIGATION OF LONG-TERM TRENDs IN STATE LEGISLATIVE
REPRESENTATION (1961).
23369 U.S. 186, 254-64 (1962). The method employed by Justice Clark
gives equal weight to each county in a joint representative district,
irrespective of the county's proportion of the total district's population.
24369 U.S. 186, 343 (1962). Justice Harlan's revision of Justice Clark's
method, supra note 23, takes into account each county's proportion of
the total district's population in assigning a legislative power index.
Assuming a chamber of one hundred members and a legislative district
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Mr. Justice Clark used a simple but imprecise calculation to express
each county's representation in both chambers. Mr. Justice Harlan's
dissent stated that Mr. Justice Clark's formula rests on faulty mathe-
matical foundations. "The fractions used.. ." he said, "are computed
by allotting to each county in a combined district an equal share of
the House or Senate seat, regardless of the voting population of each
of the counties that make up the election district. ' 25 The efforts of
Justices Clark and Harlan approach the standards this paper seeks to
establish-that of producing an index for each county (or other ap-
propriate political unit), and expressing that county's malapportion-
ment in a bicameral legislature in terms of units of underrepresented
(or overrepresented) legislative seats. What remains is to convert
this index into a percentage of total state legislative power and then
to relate this percentage to the county's percentage of total state
population.
IV. BASIC PRE-CONDITIONS OF EFFECTIVE
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
Before proceeding with the task of describing a measurement
system, the values a system intends to analyze should be made
clear. Briefly, the measurement is intended to evaluate the degree
to which an apportionment system produces equitable representa-
tion in all counties of a given state. The system thus relates a
county's population to its legislative representation; there is under-
representation where a county's population ratio is higher than its
representation ratio, and overrepresentation where a county's popu-
lation ratio is lower than its representation ratio. This system of
measurement thus proceeds from an unprovable assumption that
true democracy, in the sense of substantial equitable voting power,
is the best means by which the political community can determine
its rulers. The study simply posits the idea of political equality in
setting up the criteria for testing malapportionment. 26 To set up a
secure governmental system, there should be added to the idea of
composed of counties with populations of thirty thousand, twenty
thousand, and ten thousand, respectively, the first county would have
0.50 per cent of that chamber's legislative power, the second 0.33 per
cent, and the third 0.17 per cent.
25 369 U.S. 186, 342 (1962).
26 Professor Thorson has written: 'hat the democratic theorist must
therefore do is to posit political equality, majority rule, and minority
rights as simply given and make the business of democratic theory
purely instrumental, that is, calculate the implications of the 'givens'
and discover the most efficient ways of implementing them." THORSON,
THE LOGIC OF DEMocRAcY 3 (1962).
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"political (voting) equality the idea of majority rule, and to protect
the individual there should be added the idea of minority rights.
With these conditions in mind, it is but a simple step to draw up a
list of essential pre-conditions to the establishment of successful
representative government. First of all, the citizen must. be willing
to accept and abide by the laws made by the legislative body of
which his representative is a member (majority rule). Second, the
citizen should have some recognized and effective means of express-
ing his approval or disapproval of the official actions of his repre-
,sentative, and in stating such approval or disapproval his vote
should be equal to the vote of all others (political equality). Finally,
there should be constitutional guarantees that the legislative body
be restricted from passing laws discriminating unfairly against any
individual or group (minority rights).
The pre-conditions just mentioned are useful in drawing up a
priority list of criteria for the determination of malapportionment.
The measurement of malapportionment should first of all pin-
point areas where the people have too much or too little relative
weight in choosing representatives. Considering that district
-boundaries are generally drawn along county boundaries and that
census reports are available for counties and comparable political
sub-units of the states, a minimally valid measure of conformity
to democratic ideals should express malapportionment for each
county, or for smaller units if reliable statistics are available.
The measurement should be simple to apply by a legislative,
judicial, or other body charged with the task of alleviating mal-
apportionment.
The measurement should produce a numerical index so that
malapportionment can be compared from one state to the next.
Four of the five major methods described above, including the new
method, can also produce comparative state malapportionment
indices.
The measurement should be understandable to the citizen with
some knowledge of and interest in governmental problems. The
traditional system of deviations is perhaps the most readily under-
stood measure, but it has the disadvantage that indices thus derived
relate to each of the two houses separately rather than to both
houses together. It is in this regard that the Population-Representa-
tion Ratio (PRR) method presented here enjoys its most significant
advantage over the other methods. The percentage differentials
derived for each county can be converted into a ratio where perfect
equality of representation is indicated by 1.00; overrepresentation
by a number over 1.00; and underrepresentation by a number less
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than 1.00. As will be noted, however, the percentage differential
is much more helpful in showing precisely how many representa-
tive units should be added to or subtracted from a given county
to produce equitable -apportionment.
The measurement should be based on available, suitable and
reliable data. All systems discussed above demand the same raw
source data- population enumerations, legislative district bounda-
ries, and the number of legislators representing each district.
Finally, the measurement should conform to historical political
patterns, such as districts or, preferably, counties. Indices derived
for each county or lesser unit are superior to indices derived for
legislative districts, the boundaries of which are seldom identical
for the two legislative chambers and which in any case are likely
to change over the years and thus make historical comparisons
difficult if not impossible.
V. THE POPULATION-REPRESENTATION RATIO METHOD
A. GENERALLY.
With these standards and problems in mind, the Population-
Representation Ratio method has been derived. The PRR method
compares each county's percentage of the state population with
its percentage of the seats in both chambers of the legislature.27
This produces an index showing the differential between the two
percentages. From this index, it can be quickly determined how
many representative units (i.e., the equivalent of how many lower
chamber seats) must be given to or taken away from a par-
ticular county to bring its population and representation ratios into
substantial equilibrium. The smaller the differential between the
two ratios, of course, the smaller the degree of malapportionment
for that particular county.
An index combining a county's malapportionment in both
legislative chambers is not accomplished without some risk. Mr. Jus-
tice Harlan's criticism of Mr. Justice Clark's methodology 28 should be
sufficient warning in this regard. The PRR method may be objected
27 The PRR method can be applied to larger or smaller political units if
reliable population figures are available. In some cases, the use of
such political subdivisions as townships, cities, wards, and precincts
will be necessary to locate malapportionment within urban counties
that have been divided into several legislative districts. It has been
pointed out at a panel meeting discussing an earlier draft of this paper
that there are often inequalities within one county that are as impor-
tant as inequalities among several counties.
28-369 U.S. 186, supra note 25.
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to on the grounds that two wrongs (for example, a county grossly
overrepresented in one chamber and grossly underrepresented in
the other) do not make a right. While about one-fourth of the coun-
ties in the states of Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, South Dakota, Ten-
nessee, and Wisconsin 29 are slightly malapportioned in opposite
directions from perfectly equitable apportionment, fewer than one
in fifty are grossly malapportioned in opposite directions. The
typical highly populated county is seriously underrepresented in
one house, most often the upper chamber, and generally less seri-
ously underrepresented in the other. In the case of Michigan, for
example, Wayne county (Detroit) has 34.1 per cent of the state's
population compared with 34.5 per cent of the lower house seats
and only 20.6 per cent of the upper house seats.30 Efforts directed
toward curing malapportionment should begin with inspection of
each county's malapportionment in each of the two chambers.
Officials may also want to apply a maximum allowable deviation
to malapportionment in each separate chamber as well as in both
chambers combined.
The validity of this combination of representation ratios for
two chambers rests on the assumption that the two chambers of
American state legislatures, like the federal Congress, exercise
roughly equal powers. This assumption is made in the calculations
of Justices Clark and Harlan, and seems reasonable. Another as-
sumption, not so obviously reasonable but necessary in the absence
of a recognized standard for measuring relative effectiveness of
individual legislators, is that each member of a legislative body
exercises power equal to that of every other member. Irrespective
of the relative influence of various legislators in the legislature,
each member does have equal power in that his vote counts for
as much as that of any other member of the same chamber. Al-
though this assumption may be questioned, since it is obvious that
a district which elects a presiding officer of one chamber is likely
to get better treatment from the legislature than a district which
elects an inexperienced freshman member of the minority party,
each of the systems of measuring legislative malapportionment
mentioned above proceeds on this assumption. Scholars and jurists
29 Clem, Measuring Legislative Malapportionment: In Search of a Better
Yardstick, 7 MIDWEST J. OF POL. Sci.-(May, 1963). See also Appendix C.
30 Appendix A shows comparable figures for the largest cities in the three
states studied here-Wichita, Kansas (Sedgwick county), Omaha, Ne-
braska (Douglas county), and Sioux Falls, South Dakota (Minnehaha
county). Omaha, Wichita, and Sioux Falls are each most seriously mal-
apportioned in the upper houses of their respective states.
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have made these assumptions because relative values are confi-
dently quantifiable only on these bases.
B. THE SPECIFICS OF COMPUTING LEGISLATIVE MALAPPORTIONMENT BY
THE PRR METHOD.
The first step in applying the PRR method involves computing
the percentage of the total state population living in each county.
This percentage is entered in column one of the state table. (See
Appendix A at the conclusion of this article). For ease of compre-
hension, the ten largest counties in each state are ranked in order of
population.
The percentage of the total seats in the lower chamber elected
by each county is entered in the second column. Where the county
elects one representative, the percentage is merely the number of
seats in the lower chamber divided into one (this produces the
"representative factor" referred to in Appendix A as "percentage
of power"). Where the county elects more than one representative,
the representative factor is multiplied by the number of repre-
sentatives. In cases where the county is joined with one or more
other cinties to form a district, the percentage of the total dis-
trict population is first extracted and then multiplied by the repre-
sentative- factor or its appropriate multiple.
In the third column is entered the percentage of the total seats
in the upper chamber elected by each county, computed in the
same manner as described for the lower chamber in the preceding
paragraph.
The fourth column is the average of the percentages in columns
two and three, and represents the county's representation ratio in
the entire legislature. The difference between column one (the
population ratio) and column four (the representation ratio) is then
found. If the number of column one is higher, a minus sign indicat-
ing underrepresentation is placed before the difference (column
five); if the figure in column four is higher, a plus sign indicating
overrepresentation is placed before the difference. Column five
thus shows both the direction and degree of malapportionment for
each county.
An alternative procedure would be to divide the county's popu-
lation ratio (column one) into the county's representation ratio
(columnn four), producing an index emphasizing the relationship be-
tween the ratios. Perfect representation would be indicated by 1.00;
underrepresentation by a number less than 1.00; and overrepresenta-
tion by a number greater than 1.00. Since this study is concerned
not only with measuring malapportionment but with indicating
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precisely where and what kind *of remedial measures should be
,taken, it is thought that the absolute differential (column five) is
of greater practical use. Thus, to refer to the Kansas data,31 Sedg-
,,wick- county's differential in population and representation ratios
shows that the equivalent of 31.26 lower house seats (the differential
of -12.505 divided by 0.400, the representative unit for Kansas)
should be added to that county to produce equitable apportionment.
-The absolute- differentials in column five of the tables below have
the.-advantage that they show exactly how many lower house seats
or their equivalent must be added (or subtracted) to equalize a
given county's representation.
The problem of effecting more equal representation is now
merely-a matter of deciding a what'point deviation from the norm
becomes excessive and demands remedy. One obvious p6ssibility
would be to allow, for each county, a deviation from the norm of no
-moie than half the total legislative power represented by a seat in
the most numerous chamber. On this basis, the maximum allow-
able deviation for counties in the states of Kansas, Nebraska, and
South. Dakota32 would be 0.200, 1.163, and 0.333 respectively.33 It
-hould be.noted that there is -a direct relationship between the
number of seats in the most numerous house and the maximum
allowable deviation;- this means that the fewer members there are
,in -a-legislative chamber, the easier it can be to work out an equit-
able apportionment.
MALAPPORTIONMENT IN KANSAS,
NEBRASKA AND SOUTH DAKOTA
The apportiomnent systems of three adjoining states, Kansas,
Nebraska , and South Dakota, provide the basis for describing the
mechanics of the PRR system. Among the three states there is some
variety in population,- degree -of population concentration- or urban-
ization,-and legislative apportionment. South Dakota's 1960 popu-
lation, of 680,514 compares with Nebraska's population of 1,411,330
and Kansas' population of 2,178,611. Sixteen per cent of South
Dakota's population lives in cities with a population greater than
31 See Appendix A.
32 Malapportionment in these three states is the subject of the following
section.
33 These figures are derived by multiplying the number of seats in a
bicameral legislature's most numerous house by two, dividing the re-
sult into one hundred, and halving the dividend. For a unicameral legis-
lature, the number.of seats is divided into one hundred-and the dividend
.is halted..
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25,000, compared with thirty-two per cent for Nebraska and twenty-
nine per cent for Kansas. Appendix B lists these cities and their
populations. As to apportionment, Nebraska's unicameral legis-
lature is the most notable factor. The general pattern of urban
underrepresentation will be noted below in all three states. This
urban underrepresentation, it should be pointed out, appears to be
more a product of population growth rather than population itself.
In each state, certain counties have more than one representative;
in Kansas and Nebraska, such counties are subdivided into smaller
legislative districts, with boundaries of streets, rivers, and rural
township lines, while in South Dakota all legislators from a multi-
member county are elected at large by the voters of the entire
county. For purposes of this analysis, these investigations will
consider representation on the basis of the county alone; if reliable
population figures are available for legislative districts smaller
than a county, analysis could proceed on the basis of such sub-
county units, as mentioned above.
Appendix A lists the ten largest counties in terms of popu-
lation in each of the three states, showing population and represen-
tation ratios (columns one and four) and the difference between the
two ratios (column five) .34
As Appendix C indicates, Kansas suffers, by far, the most seri-
ous case of malapportionment among the three states analyzed
here.35 Only fourteen per cent of the counties of Kansas are equit-
ably apportioned, having differentials in population and representa-
tion ratios of less than the maximum allowable deviation. On the
other hand, seventy-six per cent of South Dakota counties and
ninety-eight per cent of Nebraska counties are equitably appor-
tioned.3 6 "Equitable apportionment" means that the county's mal-
apportionment is within the allowable deviation.
3 4 Columns 2 and 3 are elminated for Nebraska because her legislature
has but one chamber. Space considerations discourage listing the statis-
tics for all the 265 counties in the three states.
35 Another study by the present author shows that Kansas' apportionment
is also considerably less equitable than apportionment in Indiana, Michi-
gan, Tennessee, and Wisconsin; the PRR system of measuring equit-
ability of apportionment has been applied only to the four states listed
in the previous clause in addition to the three states being analyzed
here. Clem, supra note 29.
36These particular percentage figures form a valid basis for comparing
the equitability of legislative apportionment from one state to another,
but they do not provide a valid index of equitable apportionment among
counties within a given state. This is so because, to use one example,
the two Nebraska counties that are substantially underrepresented claim
as residents over thirty per cent of that state's citizens. Thus, while
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Data presented in Appendix D indicates, as would be expected,
that generally the largest counties are the ones suffering most
from underrepresentation. All of Kansas' ten largest counties are
underrepresented, eight in excess of the maximum allowable devia-
tion, while seven of Nebraska's and six of South Dakota's ten
largest counties are underrepresented (although some are within
the maximum allowable deviation).
More detailed investigation of the situations in the three states
will demonstrate what specific steps can be taken to cure malappor-
tionment once it has been located.
A. KANSAS.
This state ranks first in degree of malapportionment. Its ten
largest counties are all underrepresented. The really serious prob-
lems of underrepresentation exist in the four largest counties, Sedg-
wick, Wyandotte, Johnson, and Shawnee. Dividing the difference
in Sedgwick county's population and representation ratios (12.505)
by the value of each representative unit in Kansas (0.400) pro-
duces a dividend of 31.26. Therefore, to establish equitable appor-
tionment for Sedgwick county, thirty-one lower chamber seats (or
their equivalent in lower and upper chamber seats) must be added.
By the same process it is established that a total of seventy-two
representative units should be transferred to nine counties at the
expense of counties that are presently overrepresented. The nine
counties and the additional representative units to which they
would be entitled, if equitable apportionment were in effect in
Kansas, are as follows:
Sedgwick county (Wichita)-31 lower chamber seats
Wyandotte county (Kansas City)-14 lower chamber
seats
Johnson county (suburban Kansas City)-10 lower
chamber seats
Shawnee county (Topeka)-10 lower chamber seats
Reno county (Hutchinson)--2 lower chamber seats
Saline county (Salina)- lower chamber seat
Douglas county (Lawrence)--1 lower chamber seat
Riley county (Manhattan) -2 lower chamber seats
Geary county (Junction City)--1 lower chamber seat
Kansas' malapportionment is so severe that a complete re-writ-
ing of the apportionment system would appear to be necessary to
ninety-eight per cent of Nebraska's counties enjoy substantially equit-
able apportionment by these standards, only about seventy per cent of
her people find themselves in such favorable circumstances.
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establish anything approaching representative equality. To give
Sedgwick county, for example, thirty-one representative units
would involve so many small counties that almost all sections of
the state would be involved. The most obvious first step to adjust
legislative representation in Kansas to the spread of population
would be to eliminate the requirement that each of its 105 counties
must have at least one seat in the lower house. If this provision
must stand, then substantial equality can be achieved only by such
extreme measures as increasing the size of the lower chamber by
several times or by limiting membership in the upper chamber to
the larger counties. It might be suggested, though certainly not by
this author, that this problem is not as severe as it seems, since the
equitably apportioned upper chamber must agree to bills passed
by the lower chamber before they are presented to the governor
for his signature. Obviously, there is a danger that vetoes of this
sort might lead to a complete suspension of the legislative function,
which may indeed be precisely the goal to which some interests
aspire.
From where are the seventy-two representative units to come
in order to establish equality for the nine counties listed above?
As Appendix C indicates, there are eighty-one counties in Kansas
overrepresented in excess of the maximum allowable deviation.
Seventy-two of these representative units should be transferred to
the nine large counties and the balance of nine units assigned to
moderately underrepresented counties. It hardly needs mentioning
that adjustments of district boundaries involving properly repre-
sented counties will almost inevitably have to be made to effect a
proper apportionment; these adjustments should be made in such a
way that no new malapportionment is produced.
Once the severely malapportioned counties are located, one
needs merely to investigate the degree of misrepresentation for the
county in each of the two legislative chambers. To take the example
of Sedgwick county again, malapportionment in the upper chamber
(column three, Appendix A) is somewhat more severe than in the
lower chamber. Substantial adjustments in both chambers must be
made. To equalize Sedgwick county's representation in the two
legislative chambers, it should receive six senators instead of her
present one senator, and twenty instead of her present five repre-
sentatives. Each Kansas senator represents 2.500 representative
units and each representative 0.800; the revised apportionment
would give it 15.000 representative units in the upper house and
16.000 representative units in the lower house, an average of 15.500
for the total representation ratio. This would leave the representa-
tion ratio a little short of her population ratio, of 15,755, so another
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lower house seat could be added bringing her representation ratio
up to 15.900. It may be noted that, considering the history of legis-
lative apportionment in American states, it might be well to "over-
represent" those countries, such as Sedgwick, which are growing at
a comparatively rapid rate in comparison with population growth
in their state as a whole; -ths -will tehd to limit the natural tendency
of representation systems to become distorted with the population
movements that normally occur with the passage of time.
Adjustments should then proceed for all counties in Kansas
along similar lines.
B. NEBRASKA.
The establishment of equitable apportionment by the standards
described herein is much simpler for Nebraska than for any other
state. Because of its unicameral legislature, the investigator needs
to contend with measuring malapportionment of counties in only
one house. The excessively underrepresented counties are Douglas
(Omaha), whose population-representation ratio differential of
-8.059 divided by Nebraska's representative unit of 2.326 indicates
that it should receive three additional seats, and Lancaster *(Lin-
coin), which should receive two. If these seats were added, as is pro-
posed in L.B. 629, 7 the deviation from the norm for the counties
in the forty-nine seat Legislature contemplated by that bill, would
be virtually within the allowable deviation found above.8
C. SOUTH DAKOTA.
Malapportionment in South Dakota, on the basis of these inves-
tigations, is less serious than in Kansas and more serious than in
Nebraska. Five counties, including the four most heavily populated,
are underrepresented in excess of the maximum allowable devia-
tion. These counties are listed below with the additional represen-
tative-units needed to establish equality:
Minnehaha (Sioux Falls)-6 lower chamber seats
Pennington (Rapid City)-5 lower chamber-seats
Brown (Aberdeen) -2 lower chamber seats
Beadle (Huron)- lower chamber seat
Fall River (Hot Springs) -1 lower chamber seat
Minnehaha and Brown counties are most seriously underrepre-
sented in the upper house and Pennington, Beadle, and Fall River
counties in the lower house. Eleven counties (Turner, Tripp; Butte,
87 L.B. 629, 78th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1963). (Ed's. Note: Passed Apr. 27, 1963).
38 See text at note 33. supra. See also Appendix C, infra.
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McCook, Corson, Miner, Douglas, Sanborn, Hanson, Faulk, and
Campbell) are overrepresented in excess of the maximum allowable
deviation and thus are likely victims if more equitable apportion-
ment is to be established in South Dakota.
VII. CONCLUSION
This article has located those counties in Kansas, Nebraska, and
South Dakota whose apportionment of state legislators is seriously
out of proportion to their percentage of total state population. The
statistics that have been developed constitute a useful first step
toward bringing each county's population and representation ratios
into closer balance; this end is achieved by awarding additional
representation to seriously underrepresented counties at the ex-
pense of seriously overrepresented counties.
This objective may be accomplished by the respective state
legislatures themselves, although for understandable reasons Ameri-
can state legislatures have not given the public much hope for
remedial action. It might also be accomplished by special commit-
tees or boards set up by the legislatures. The committee's fuction
would be to re-arrange districts every few years, or in the event
that the legislature itself fails to act within a specified time limit.
If the intent of the recent series of malapportionment decisions
is to force more equitable apportionments, then in the absence of
state legislative action it appears that increasingly forceful and
specific federal judicial action will be forthcoming. This sort of
court action would seem to demand some agreement on the proper
mathematical tools that would be employed in locating malappor-
tionment. It is hoped that this article may prove of use in establish-
ing the efficacy of such tools.
Other reforms of state and local government, such as adoption
of a unicameral legislative body following Nebraska's example,
county consolidation,39 or adjusting the size of the legislative
39 Professor David has stated that "it may be appropriate to note that many
of the overrepresented areas in question are long overdue for a sub-
stantial consolidation of counties into a much smaller number than
presently exists. With enough county consolidation, a rule of at least
one member for each county might conceivably be retained. It would
seem, however, that the consolidation into a smaller number of legisla-
tive districts will have to come first if county consolidation for purposes
of more effective local government is to come later or at all." David &
Eisenberg, State Legislative Redistricting: Some Practical Issues in
the Wake of Judicial Decision 17 (mimeographed ms. read at the Ameri-
can Political Science Association convention, Washington, D.C., Sept. 5,
1962).
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bodies to permit more equitable allocation of seats, have been sug-
gested and would indirectly simplify the difficult task of achieving
balanced apportionment. Various devices of this kind will recom-
mend themselves in varying degree to the several states, depending
on the local situation. It would seem to be in the interests of each
state to examine its problems and seek solutions that would fore-
stall direct action by the federal courts.
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APPENDIX A
COMPARISON OF POPULATION AND REPRESENTATION RATIOS
FOR TEN LARGEST COUNTIES IN KANSAS, NEBRASKA, AND
SOUTH DAKOTA, BASED ON 1960 FEDERAL CENSUS AND
APPORTIONMENTS AS OF DECEMBER, 1962
Column Column Column Column Column
One Two Three Four Five
Differential
Between
County Percent of Percent of Percent of Population
Percent of Power in Power in Power in and
State Lower Upper Both Representa-
Population House House Houses tion Ratios
KANSAS
Sedgwick 15.755 4.000 2.500 3.250 -12.505
Wyandotte 8.514 3.200 2.500 2.850 - 5.664
Johnson 6.600 2.400 2.500 2.450 - 4.150
Shawnee 6.485 2.400 2.500 2.450 - 4.035
Reno 2.711 1.600 2.500 2.050 - .661
Saline 2.511 1.600 2.225 1.913 - .598
Leavenworth 2.227 1.600 2.500 2.050 - .177
Montgomery 2.066 1.600 2.500 2.050 - .016
Douglas 2.007 1.600 1.988 1.794 - .213
Riley 1.924 .800 1.355 1.078 - .846
NEBRASKA
Douglas 24.338 - - 16.279 - 8.059
Lancaster 11.002 - - 6.977 - 4.025
Hall 2.534 - - 1.884 - .650
Scotts Bluff 2.396 - - 2.326 - .070
Dodge 2.301 - - 1.693 - .608
Sarpy 2.216 - - 1.481 - .735
Adams 2.051 - - 1.895 - .156
Lincoln 2.019 - - 2.021 .002
Gage 1.900 - - 2.326 .426
Buffalo 1.859 - - 1.930 .071
SOUTH DAKOTA
Minnehaha 12.72 12.00 5.71 8.86 - 3.86
Pennington 8.55 5.33 5.71 5.52 - 3.03
Brown 5.01 4.00 2.86 3.43 - 1.58
Beadle 3.19 2.67 2.86 2.76 - .43
Codington 2.97 2.67 2.86 2.76 - .21
Brookings 2.95 2.67 2.86 2.76 - .18
Yankton 2.58 2.67 2.86 2.76 - .19
Lawrence 2.51 2.67 2.86 2.76 .25
Davison 2.45 2.67 2.86 2.76 .31
Roberts 1.94 1.33 2.86 2.10 .16
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APPENDIX B
CITIES WITH A POPULATION GREATER THAN 25,000
IN KANSAS, NEBRASKA, AND SOUTH DAKOTA
City
KANSAS
Wichita
Kansas City
Topeka
Salina
Hutchinson
Lawrence
Prairie Village
NEBRASKA
Omaha
Lincoln
Grand Island
SOUTH DAKOTA
Sioux Falls
Rapid City
Source: U.S. Census Bureau,
POPULATION (1961).
Population
254,698
121,901
119,484
43,202
37,574
32,858
25,356
301,598
128,521
25,742
65,466
42,399
1960 CENSUS OF
APPENDIX C
MALAPPORTIONMENT IN THE COUNTIES OF
KANSAS, NEBRASKA, AND SOUTH DAKOTA
State
(with Number
of Counties)
Kansas (105)
Nebraska (93)
South Dakota (67
TOTALS
Counties
Overrepresent
Exces- Mod-
sive erate
81 7
0 79
) 11 38
92 124
Counties
ted Underrepresented
Exces- Mod-
Total sive erate Total
88 9 8 17
79 2 11 13
49 5 13 18
216 16 32 48
APPENDIX D
MALAPPORTIONMENT IN THE TEN LARGEST COUNTIES OF
KANSAS, NEBRASKA, AND SOUTH DAKOTA
Overrepresented
Counties
Excessive Moderate
0 0
0 3
0 4
Underrepresented
Counties
Excessive Moderate
8 2
2 5
4 2
0 7 14 9
Counties
Properly
Appor-
tioned
0
1
0
1
State
Kansas
Nebraska
South Dak
TOTALS
:ota
Total
10
10
10
30
